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Abstract. It is widely held that if an object a is identical (or non-identical)
to an object b, then it is necessary that a is identical (non-identical) to b.
This view is supported by an argument from Leibniz’s Law and by a popular
conception of de re modality. On the other hand, there are good reasons to
allow for contingent identity. Various alternative accounts of de re modality
have been developed to achieve this kind of generality, and to explain what is
wrong with the argument from Leibniz’s Law.
1 Introduction
If an object a is identical to an object b, in the sense that a and b are one and the same
object, does it follow that a and b are necessarily identical? If a and b are not identical,
does it follow that they are necessarily non-identical?
It may seem obvious that the answer is ‘no’. For example, it is contingent whether all
cats are on the mat, and therefore whether the set of cats is identical to the set of cats
on the mat. But here’s a puzzle. It is not contingent that the set of cats is identical to
the set of cats. So the set of cats has a property – being necessarily identical to the set
of cats – which the set of cats on the mat lacks. By Leibniz’s Law, if an object a has
different properties than an object b, then a and b are not identical. It follows that the
set of cats is not identical to the set of cats on the mat. Have we established, by a priori
reasoning, that not all cats are on the mat?
A plausible diagnosis of what went wrong with this argument is that it rests on an
equivocation. Statements like
(*) it is necessary that the set of cats is identical to the set of cats
are ambiguous. On the de dicto reading, (*) says that the proposition expressed by ‘the
set of cats is identical to the set of cats’ could not have been false. On the de re reading,
(*) attributes to the set of cats the property of being necessarily identical to the set of
cats. The argument assumes that (*) is true on its de re interpretation. But this is
implausible. To see why, suppose there are in fact only two cats, Tibbles and Tabbles.
Then the set of cats is the set {Tibbles,Tabbles}. But there could have been another cat,
Tubbles. In this case, the set {Tibbles,Tabbles} would not have been the set of cats. So
it is not necessary of the set of cats, i.e. of {Tibbles,Tabbles}, that it is the set of cats.
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Intuitively, the reason why the two readings of (*) come apart is that ‘the set of cats’
picks out different things under different possible circumstances. If Tibbles and Tabbles
are the only cats, ‘the set of cats’ denotes {Tibbles,Tabbles}; but under the supposition
that there is another cat Tubbles, ‘the set of cats’ picks out {Tibbles,Tabbles,Tubbles}.
While the de dicto reading of (*) merely requires that under all possible circumstances,
whatever is picked out by ‘the set of cats’ is identical to itself, the de re reading requires
that whatever set is actually picked out by ‘the set of cats’ – say, {Tibbles,Tabbles} – is
picked out by ‘the set of cats’ under all possible circumstances, which is false.
One might draw the following lessons from these observations. First, contingent identity
de dicto is common and unproblematic. On the other hand, there can be no contingent
identities de re: it is never contingent of a and b whether the first is identical to the
second. If a and b are one and the same thing, how could it be true of this thing that it
is not identical to itself? Relatedly, an identity statement ‘a = b’ can never be contingent
if the reference of ‘a’ and ‘b’ does not vary across possible circumstances. For then ‘a’
and ‘b’ can’t denote the same thing under some circumstances and different things under
others.
These lessons were prominently defended by Saul Kripke in [Kripke 1971] and [Kripke
1980], and have become widely accepted in recent philosophy. But not everyone has been
convinced. A vocal minority still resists the Kripkean orthodoxy. Let us look at some
reasons that could motivate such resistance.
2 Contingent identities
One motivation to reject the Kripkean orthodoxy are doubts about the very coherence of
de re modality. Quine [1953] suggested that it makes no sense to say that such-and-such
is necessary or possible of an object, independently of how the object is described. What
Quine had in mind when he talked about necessity and possibility was logical or semantical
necessity. A statement is logically necessary (on the model-theoretic understanding)
if it is true in every model, under every interpretation of its non-logical terms. On
this account, ‘the capital of England is the capital of England’ may count as logically
necessary. But what would it mean to say that it is logically necessary of the capital of
England, i.e. of London, that it is the capital of England?
Well, we might say that a formula Φ(x) is logically necessary of an object a iff Φ(x) is
satisfied by every object in every model – i.e., iff ∀xΦ(x) is logically necessary; similarly
for formulas with several free variables (see [Fine 1989]). Quine may have regarded
this option as uninteresting (as [Burgess 1998] argues), but it does have an interesting
consequence for our present topic. For it follows that x=y is not necessary of any pair
〈a, a〉, since it is not satisfied by every pair in every model. (On the other hand, x=x is
necessary of any object a). In other words, there are logically contingent identities de re.
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Analogous considerations support the possibility of semantically contingent identities de
re.
The most common interpretation of ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ in ordinary English is
not logical or semantical, but epistemic. In this sense, to say that something is possible
roughly means that it is compatible with the available evidence, or the relevant subject’s
beliefs. Does this reading allow for contingent identities de re? Arguably yes. Consider
a famous example from [Quine 1956]. Ralph has noticed a suspicious looking man in a
brown hat and comes to believe that the man is a spy. In fact, the man is Ortcutt, so
Ralph believes of Ortcutt (de re) that he is a spy. On another occasion, Ralph encounters
a grey-haired man on the beach, who he believes to be a pillar of the community. That
man is also Ortcutt, so Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is not a spy. Ralph cannot
detect the tension between his two beliefs, because they are based on different ways of
identifying Ortcutt. We might say that under the guise of the man in the hat, Ralph
believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy, but not under the guise of the man on the beach.
Now it looks like we have a case of contingent identity de re. Ralph’s beliefs represent
one and the same person, Ortcutt, as two – one spy, one non-spy. Moreover, if we can
truly say that Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy, then it should also be true
that Ralph believes of the man in the brown hat and the man on the beach (i.e., of
Ortcutt and Ortcutt) that the former is not identical to the latter. Just as Ralph believes
different things of Ortcutt relative to different guises, he believes different things of the
pair 〈Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉 relative to different ways of presenting this pair. Under at least
one guise, he believes of the pair that its members are not identical.
Examples of epistemically contingent identity typically involve a single object which is
known to the subject under different guises, as the occupant of different roles. But there
might also be other cases. Suppose Ralph mistakenly believes that the flat next door to
his is inhabited by identical twins, while in fact it is inhabited by a single person, Anne.
Whenever Ralph sees Anne on the staircase, he thinks he sees one of the twins, but he
doesn’t associate different roles with the two. It is not entirely clear what Ralph believes
of Anne, or of the pair 〈Anne,Anne〉, but in some sense Ralph seems to believe of one
person that she is two.
The controversy over contingent identity mostly concerns “metaphysical” contingency.
Since a strong case can be made for the coherence of contingent identity in the logical,
semantic and epistemic domain, the orthodox position implies – implausibly, as some
would say – that metaphysical modality is a special kind, quite unlike the others.
In addition, philosophers have offered various examples of metaphysically contingent
identities de re. Gibbard [1975] describes the case of a lump of clay (‘Lumpl’) which,
during the whole time of its existence, has the shape of a statue. He argues that the
statue (‘Goliath’) is identical to the lump, although the identity is contingent: if the
creator of the statue had decided to add a copper hat, then Lumpl the lump would only
3
have been a (proper) part of the statue Goliath. Lewis [1986: 248f.] presents a similar
example that does not raise questions about material constitution. Consider a railway
network that might have included a further line. Lewis suggests that the network is
identical – but only contingently identical – to the network minus that line (see also
[Cartwright 1975], [van Inwagen 1981]). Chandler [1975] points out that a common
answer to the puzzle of Theseus’ ship seems to entail that whether the reconstructed ship
is identical to the original ship is contingent on the presence of the renovated ship.
Other motivations concern non-concrete objects such as properties or events. Several
philosophers have argued that dispositions are contingently identical to their causal
bases (see e.g. [Armstrong et al. 1996]). It is also tempting to say that a walk may
be contingently identical to a stroll, an eating of dessert to an eating of custard, or an
occurrence of pain to a biological process in the brain (see e.g. [Smart 1959]).
These cases all involve a single object that is associated with different roles or guises
(as statue, as lump of clay), which correspond to different ways of identifying the object
under hypothetical circumstances. Other candidates are more like the case of Anne.
When a human embryo splits, it sometimes happens that the resulting embryos merge
back into one, producing a single person. If the embryos hadn’t fused, they would have
become identical twins. Arguably, each of the twins which then would have existed is, in
the actual world, identical to the single person produced from the same sperm and egg.
There are also intuitively plausible cases of contingent non-identity: two islands might
have been a single island, or two tribes a single tribe (see [Karmo 1983]).
An adequate discussion of these examples would go beyond the scope of this survey.
In each case, we would have to ask whether the alleged identity (or non-identity) really
obtains, whether it obtains contingently, and whether the contingency is de re rather
than merely de dicto. Of course, a friend of contingent identity need not agree with any –
let alone all – the candidates I mentioned. On the other hand, she will reject the most
common objection to all these cases: that the very idea of contingent identity (de re) is
deeply problematic, if not logically inconsistent.
3 The case against contingent identity
There are two main reasons for the widespread reservations against contingent identity.
The first is the seeming force of the argument from Leibniz’s Law that we met in section
1: if a and b are contingently identical, then b has the property of being contingently
identical to a, whilst a does not have this property; by Leibniz’s Law, it follows that a
and b are not identical after all.
The argument is sometimes put into the language of modal predicate logic:
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1. 2a=a.
2. a=b ⊃ (2a=a ⊃ 2a=b).
3. 2a=a ⊃ (a=b ⊃ 2a=b). (From 2 by propositional logic)
4. a=b ⊃ 2a=b. (From 1 and 3 by modus ponens)
Premise 1 is derivable from the reflexivity axiom a=a by the standard modal rule of
necessitation. Premise 2 is an instance of the substitution principle
(Sub) a=b ⊃ (Φ ⊃ Φ[b/a]),
where Φ[b/a] is the formula Φ with one or more occurrences of a replaced by b. Thus
each step in 1–4 is licenced by familiar principles of modal and predicate logic. This
is a bit of a curiosity, since the conclusion is plainly false if the box is read as logical
necessity, and plausibly contingent if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are, respectively, ‘{x : x is a cat}’ and
‘{x : x is a cat on the mat}’. Indeed, until about the 1970s, the argument was usually
taken to establish not the necessity of identity, but the need to revise or restrict the
relevant principles of modal or predicate logic (see e.g. [Church 1943], [Kanger 1957]).
The most obvious culprit is the application of (Sub) in premise 2. Substitution
principles often become invalid under extensions of a language. For instance, while (Sub)
is valid in quantifier-free predicate logic, in first-order logic it must be restricted to cases
where b is “free for” a in Φ. In a language with the expressive resources of English, (Sub)
is invalid for a large variety of further reasons (see e.g. [Fine 1989: 56–70]). In particular,
modal contexts are generally not open to substitution of co-referring expressions, as
witnessed by the example of the sets of cats.
An adequate formalisation of the argument from Leibniz’ Law requires some means
for drawing the de dicto/de re distinction. A common device to this end is predicate
abstraction (see e.g. [Fitting and Mendelsohn 1998]). Predicate abstracts are expressions
of the form (λx.Φ(x)), which turns the open formula Φ(x) into a syntactical predicate.
Thus (λx.2x= a) is a complex predicate expressing the property of being necessarily
identical to a; (λxλy.2x = y) expresses the two-place property of being necessarily
identical. The argument from Leibniz’s Law can now be stated as follows.
1′. (λxλy.2x=y)aa.
2′. a=b ⊃ ((λxλy.2x=y)aa ⊃ (λxλy.2x=y)ab).
3′. (λxλy.2x=y)aa ⊃ (a=b ⊃ (λxλy.2x=y)ab). (From 2′)
4′. a=b ⊃ (λxλy.2x=y)ab. (From 1′ and 3′)
In premise 2′, (Sub) is only applied to occurrences of a and b outside the scope of modal
operators. The conclusion 4′ is no longer the de dicto claim that if a = b then necessarily,
a = b, but the de re claim that if a = b then a and b have the property of being necessarily
identical.
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It is sometimes objected that things can only be identical if they exist, wherefore
premise 1′ should be replaced by (λxλy.2(∃z(z = x) ⊃ x= y))aa, and the conclusion
becomes a= b ⊃ (λxλy.2(∃z(z= x) ⊃ x= y))ab. Alternatively, one could replace the
sentential operator 2 by a predicate modifier, as suggested e.g. in [Wiggins 1974]. I will
set aside the question of contingent existence here, since it is orthogonal to the question
of contingent identity.
What could a friend of contingent identity say in response to the argument from Leibniz’
Law? There are four main options. First, one might question some presupposition of
the argument. For instance, one might claim that identity statements must always be
relativised to a kind ([Geach 1967]) or a possible world ([Gallois 1998]). Or one might
reject de re modality as incoherent, which would only leave the clearly invalid de dicto
version of the argument.
Second, one could criticise the application of (Sub) in premise 2′, despite the fact that
the substituted terms are outside the scope of modal operators. [Noonan 1991] argues
that modal predicates can express different properties when combined with different
singular terms. Such predicates he dubs Aberlardian. A classic example of an Abelardian
predicate in English is Quine’s ‘– is so-called because of his size’, which expresses different
properties depending on whether the blank is filled by ‘Giorgione’ or ‘Barbarelli’. If the
predicate (λxλy.2x=y) is similarly sensitive to the attached singular terms, then 2′ is
not a valid application of Leibniz’s Law.
A third possibility is to reject premise 1′. This is where the argument breaks down if
the box is read as logical necessity: as we saw in section 2, x=y is not logically true of
〈a, a〉. Here it is important not to conflate (as e.g. [Kripke 1971] does) the claim that a
and a are necessarily identical with the claim that a is necessarily self-identical, which
we would formalise as (λx.2x=x)a. (On this point, see also [Lowe 1982] and [Baldwin
1984].)
Finally, a fourth response to the argument is to accept its conclusion. As will see in
the next section, not every advocate of contingent identity denies 4′.
I said that there are two main reasons in support of the Kripkean orthodoxy. One
is the argument from Leibniz’s Law. More important is arguably the second. Many
philosophers accept a general picture of modality that appears to leave no room for
contingent identity de re. According to this picture, modal statements can be understood
as quantifying over possible worlds; each possible world represents a maximally specific
way a world might have been. Among other things, a world must settle what is true and
false of any given individual, e.g. whether Barack Obama won the 2008 election. The
interpretation of de re modality is then straightforward. It is true of Barack Obama that
he could have lost the 2008 elections iff there is some world that represents Obama as
losing. There is never any difficulty or ambiguity when it comes to locating an actual
individual at other possible worlds. Moreover, a world can never represent a given object
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a as being two: ∃x∃y(x, y ∧ x= a ∧ y= a) does not express a way things might have
been.
Some objections to contingent identity are based on this picture. I already mentioned
the objection from rigidity. In the picture just outlined, a rigid designator is usually
defined as a term that denotes the very same individual relative to all possible worlds.
As Kripke [1971: 154] argues, it then follows that identity statements involving rigid
designators are never contingent. In particular, if ‘a = b’ is true, then ‘a’ and ‘b’ denote
the same individual in the actual world; being rigid, they donate this very individual
relative to every world; hence there is no world relative to which ‘a’ and ‘b’ have different
referents.
In the context of the standard picture, this argument may be persuasive, but it carries
little force against those who reject the picture. To be sure, the distinction between
rigid and non-rigid designators is important, but it need not be drawn in precisely the
way Kripke draws it. [Gibbard 1975: 195], [Lewis 1986: 256], [Stalnaker 1997: 186] and
[Gallois 1998: 72f.], for example, suggest other ways of characterising rigidity that leave
room for contingent identity. Even if one accepts that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rigid in the sense
of denoting the same object relative to every possible world, it does not follow that an
identity statement between ‘a’ and ‘b’ must be non-contingent. Suppose ‘a = b’ is true at
the actual world. A friend of contingent identity might accept that at every world w, ‘a’
denotes a and ‘b’ denotes b, but reject the alleged consequence that ‘a’ and ‘b’ co-refer at
w, since a and b need not be identical at w. One can even accept that for each world w,
the referent of ‘a’ at w is identical to the referent of ‘b’ at w. After all, the referent of ‘a’
at w is a, the referent of ‘b’ at w is b, and by assumption a and b are indeed identical –
i.e. identical at the actual world. Without presupposing the necessity of identity, it does
not follow that they are also identical at w.
This point has been emphasised by Robert Stalnaker [1987] in response to the related
argument from the transitivity of identity. The argument says that if a single object a is
identical to two objects c and d at another possible world w, then it ought to be true
that a = c, and that d = a, which would entail that c = d – contradicting the assumption
that c and d are two. Stalnaker objects that c and d are meant to be two only in the
counterfactual scenario w. This is perfectly compatible with the assumption that they
are actually one, i.e. that c = d.
4 Accounts of contingent identity
Most advocates of contingent identity endorse some alternative to the standard picture
of de re modality. In effect, I have already sketched such an alternative for logical and
epistemic modality. On the interpretation of logical necessity from section 2, to say that
a formula Φ is necessary of a given object is to say that Φ is true in all models under all
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interpretations of the free variables. This is in the spirit of early possible worlds semantics,
where the space of worlds was understood as the space of models of the relevant language
(see e.g. [Carnap 1946]). Formally, the main difference to contemporary Kripke semantics
is that first-order variables and names are treated as non-rigid: their extension can vary
from world to world.
For epistemic modalities, there are two basic options. One is to file contingent identity
under the “problem of logical omniscience”. The problem, in general, is to explain how
we can know a fact A and fail to know a fact B, although A and B are logically or
metaphysically equivalent. This seems to call for means that go beyond standard possible
worlds models of knowledge and belief. A popular idea is to add “impossible worlds” to
the space of epistemic possibilities; see [Priest 2005: ch.2] for a discussion of contingent
identity in this context. A rather different approach is the one I sketched in section
2. It is motivated by the observation that there is nothing impossible about the way
Ralph, for example, sees the world: according to Ralph, there is a man in a brown hat
who is a spy and another man on the beach who is not a spy. As it happens, the man
in the brown hat is identical to the man on the beach, but Ralph isn’t aware of that.
When we say that Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy, we are partly talking about
the content of Ralph’s beliefs and partly about the actual object at which his belief is
directed. Roughly speaking, to say that a subject s believes de re of a that it is F means
that a satisfies a suitable condition G and s believes that the unique object satisfying G
is F . Here G represents the “guise” under which the subject attributes F to a. (See e.g.
[Lewis 1986: 32–34], [Cresswell and von Stechow 1982].)
Turning to metaphysical modality, a very different and more radical proposal is defended
in [Gallois 1998]. Gallois argues that all predications, including attributions of identity,
must be relativised to a possible world (and a time, but let’s ignore that). A complete
statement of Leibniz’s Law would therefore say that whenever a= b at a world w and
x has property P at w, then y has P at w (see [Gallois 1998: 145]). This blocks the
argument from Leibniz’s Law. If at the actual world @, a has the property of being
necessarily identical to a, and at @, a = b, then according to Gallois it does follow that
at @, b has the property of being necessarily identical to a. So it is true for all worlds w
that at @, at w, a is identical to b. But it does not follow that a and b are identical at
all worlds, for the double operator ‘at @, at w’ is not redundant. According to Gallois
[1998: 149], it is governed by the following rule:
(E) at @, at w,Φ(a)⇔ ∃x(at @, x=a ∧ at w,Φ(x)).
In the case where a is contingently identical to b, there is (absolutely speaking) an object
x (namely b) such that at @, x = a and at all worlds w, x = b. Hence at @, at w, a = b
is true for all worlds w, although at w, a = b is not true for all w.
Gallois’s proposal has not found many supporters, in part because he offers no deeper
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explanation for why modal operators should obey rules like (E). Most advocates of
metaphysically contingent identity accept that statements of the form ‘a= b’ express
complete propositions. What they reject is the idea that the identification of objects
across possible worlds is always unambiguous and unproblematic. Suppose I am looking
at parts for a new bicycle. Which of the possible bikes that I consider building are
identical to the actual bike I make? Which of them are identical to one another? Could
the bike I actually build have had a different fork? A different frame? The standard
picture seems to assume that there is a precise and determinate answer to all such
questions: either there is a metaphysically possible world at which this very bike has a
different frame, or there isn’t. On the alternative view, this determinacy is an illusion.
When we ask what could have been true of a given object, the answer depends on which
features of the object we happen to hold fixed. Qua aggregate of such-and-such parts,
the bike could not have had a different frame; qua bike that I assembled, it could (see
e.g. [Lewis 1986: 251–255]).
How can we model this in something like the Kripkean framework? One option is
to take individual possibilities rather than possible worlds as basic (see [Lewis 1986:
230–235]). A (unary) individual possibility is, or represents, a maximally specific way an
individual might be – a maximally specific property. To say that being Φ is possible of a
is to say that there is a Φ possibility accessible from the way a actually is. The shiftiness
and indeterminacy of modal judgments is explained by the shiftiness and indeterminacy
of the accessibility relation.
A more traditional approach is to model de re modality in terms of possible worlds.
Unlike in the standard picture, possible worlds do not directly represent truths about
individuals from other worlds. For example, a possible world might be taken to represent
a (maximally specific) qualitative way a world might be: it settles how many things
there are and which qualitative properties and relations they instantiate, but it does not
explicitly single out one of these objects as, say, Barack Obama. Roughly speaking, a
world represents de re of Obama that he lost the 2008 elections by representing that an
individual with certain features G lost the elections, where G are features which Obama
has in the actual world. (Note the similarity to the above account of epistemic de re.)
The shiftiness of modal judgments comes from the shiftiness of the “identifying” features
G.
Suppose a possible world represents that there is an individual with such-and-such
properties. It proves convenient to say that there is a possible individual at that world
with just those properties. If a possible individual b at a world w resembles an actual
object a in the right way, so that w represents de re of a that it has whatever properties b
has, then b is called a counterpart of a. The counterpart relation mirrors the accessibility
relation between individual possibilities: a is possibly F iff a has a counterpart that is F .
The details of the picture depend to some extent on the metaphysics of possible worlds
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and possible individuals, see e.g. [Lewis 1986] and [Stalnaker 1987] for different ways
of spelling them out. (See also [Woodward 2012] for a more gentle introduction to the
present ideas.)
On the counterpart-theoretic picture, contingent identity can arise in two different
ways. First, a single possible world can represent different possibilities for an actual
individual a relative to different choices of the counterpart relation. For instance, at a
world where the statue Goliath was given a copper hat, the whole statue may qualify as
counterpart of the actual statue qua statue, while only its clay part is a counterpart of
the statue qua lump of clay. Secondly, a world can represent several possibilities for an
individual a under the very same counterpart relation. This is what arguably happens in
the case of the embryos that might not have fused, or – in the epistemic domain – in the
case of Ralph’s mistaken beliefs about Anne.
Gibbard [1975] analyses contingent identity in the framework of individual concept
semantics (see [Hughes and Cresswell 1996: ch.18]). Formally, this can be seen as a
species of counterpart semantics, with the following assumptions:
(i) Counterpart relations are semantically associated with singular terms; e.g. different
relations are associated with ‘Lumpl’ and ‘Goliath’.
(ii) Nothing has multiple counterparts at a single world under the same counterpart
relation.
(iii) Counterpart relations are equivalence relations.
Assumption (i) renders modal predicates Abelardian: whether ‘a is possibly F ’ is true
depends not just on the reference of ‘a’, but also on the associated counterpart relation.
The functionality assumption (ii) means that a counterpart relation determines for every
possible individual a a (partial) function Ia that maps each world w to a’s counterpart
at w (if any). Such functions are known as individual concepts or intensional objects.
According to individual concept semantics, ‘a is possibly F ’ is true iff for some world
w, the possible individual Ia(w) has property F . Finally, (iii) ensures that Ia = Ia′
whenever a′ = Ia(w) for some world w, which means that instead of associating terms
with referents and counterpart relations, we can simply associate them with individual
concepts.
If the semantic value of a singular term includes, besides a referent, a counterpart
relation or an individual concept, one should distinguish between reference and semantic
value. It would be problematic for an advocate of contingent identity to say that ‘Lumpl’
and ‘Goliath’ refer to intensional objects (or, as Gibbard says, that variables range over
intensional objects). For this sounds as if Lumpl and Goliath (the referents of ‘Lumpl’ and
‘Goliath’) are really two different objects, whose non-identity is only hidden by a deviant
interpretation of the identity predicate. Charitably understood, Gibbard’s proposal is
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not that Lumpl and Goliath are individual concepts, but that modal constructions are
sensitive to more than the reference of singular terms.
Instead of adding counterpart relations to a term’s semantic value, it is often held that
the relevant relation is determined (to the extent that it is) by conversational context,
although suggestive vocabulary can influence the choice (see e.g. [Lewis 1983: 42ff.]). On
this account, de re modal predications are referentially transparent. For instance, since it
is true of Goliath that he could have been partly made of copper (namely qua statue), it
is also true of Lumpl that he could have been partly made of copper (qua statue). That
it often looks like we can’t substitute ‘Lumpl’ for ‘Goliath’ in modal contexts is due to
the fact that these names pragmatically evoke different counterpart relations.
Is it then true of Lumpl and Goliath that they are possibly non-identical? Relative to
any choice of counterpart relation, the counterparts of Lumpl are precisely the counterparts
of Goliath. One might conclude that there is no choice under which Lumpl and Goliath
satisfy (λxλy.3x,y). This leads to the form of contingent identity account that accepts
the conclusion of the argument from Leibniz’ Law (see [Stalnaker 1987], [Stalnaker
1994], [Gray 2001]). By contrast, Lewis [1983: 44f.], following [Hazen 1979], argues that
counterparts of pairs of objects should not be equated with pairs of counterparts of
the individual objects. Thus an identity pair 〈a, a〉 can have a non-identity pair as a
counterpart, even though every counterpart of its first member is also a counterpart of
the second. The argument from Leibniz’s Law then goes wrong at premise 1′.
Like the orthodox picture, the counterpart-theoretic picture can be developed in
different ways, leading to different modal logics. For some recent investigations into
this territory, see [Braüner and Ghilardi 2007: 591–616], [Kracht and Kutz 2007: 976f.],
[Russell 2012] and [Schwarz 2012].
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